Finnacl Research

R10 · EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Denominator Decides

The findings in brief — free edition

As of 2026-09-12

Every figure carries its source and its as-of date.

The Denominator Decides

Companies that hold cryptocurrency on the balance sheet, and how they are valued.

We rebuilt five listed crypto-treasury companies from their own SEC filings — **34 source documents and 5 EDGAR submission indexes** — and measured each with identical arithmetic at one instant. Coin counts and share counts are filed figures. Every price is market data, labelled as such and struck at **2026-09-08 16:00 ET**. No vendor, no aggregator, no consensus estimate anywhere.

The finding

One company, one afternoon, one set of filed inputs — and three defensible answers.

Measure	Result	Reads as
Equity market capitalisation ÷ **total** coin value	**0.865**	a **13.5% discount**
(Market capitalisation + senior claims − cash) ÷ total coin value	**1.088**	an **8.8% premium**
Share price ÷ **residual** coins per share	**1.276**	a **27.6% premium**

The first charges the common equity against the whole coin stack, including the **$21.318bn** of it that belongs to preferred and note holders. The third deducts what the common does not own. Neither corrects the other — **the gap between them is exactly the size of the capital structure**, which is **32.16%** of the coin stack at this company and **0.25%** at another in the same table.

The industry quotes whichever of the three supports its argument. A reader shown one of them has not been shown a valuation. They have been shown a choice of denominator, and it was not named.

The half the rally hides

Between the last quarterly filing's cover date of **2026-07-24** and the close of **2026-09-08**, the company's coin count rose **0.151%** and its share count rose **9.33%** — **35,848,448 shares issued for $3,886.7M net**. So:

	2026-07-24	2026-09-08	Change
Bitcoin per 1,000 basic shares	**2.1960**	**2.0117**	**−8.40%**

A holder who bought the shares for exposure to the coins owns 8.40% less bitcoin per share, while the share price rose **48.93%** over the same days. Over fourteen months the fall is **9.28%**, and almost all of it happened in the last six and a half weeks of that period. **No market price enters that arithmetic**, which is why it survives a rally or a fall — and why it is the figure nobody quotes.

And an obligation with a date on it

$5,913,659k of convertible note principal — 88.1% of the $6,713,659k outstanding — can be put back to the company at par by 2028-09-15. The maturity column of the same table reads 2028 to 2032 and is the wrong column to read. **73.0%** falls inside calendar 2028 alone.

Beside it, the annual cash call, rebuilt from five preferred series and six note tranches rather than quoted: **$1,762,548,028** at 2026-06-30, against the company's own "*approximately $1.76 billion*" — **agreement to 0.145%**. It has since fallen to **$1,660,054,984** as preferred is retired, covered **36.9 months** over by a $5.10bn reserve against a board floor of twelve.

What we could not explain, and did not pretend to

The obvious story is that leverage causes the discount. **The cross-section refuses it.** One company in the same table carries **$5.572M of total liabilities against $2.207bn of ether** — no debt, no preferred, no dividend — and trades at **0.868**. The levered one, with **$21.318bn** ranking ahead of it, trades at **0.865**. **They are indistinguishable.**

So this report states the measurement finding and **names no cause**. Where the capital structure does show up is the enterprise measure, on which the levered company is the *more expensive* of the two.

Why this is not a report about a premium

The research was opened on a claim about where one company's ratio sat. **That number moved 32.9% in six and a half weeks on price action alone**, from 0.651 to 0.865, with nothing about the business changing. Finnacl publishes under the Advisers Act publisher's exclusion, whose third limb requires a genuine, regular publishing cadence. **A measure that decays in days cannot carry a report published on one.** The perishable version was dropped before a word of it was drafted, and the durable findings were rescoped into this one.

Three corrections we printed against ourselves

1. **A fund weight we published was wrong.** An earlier screen recorded one crypto-equity fund as **18.24%** treasury companies. **It is 20.32%** — the earlier pass read the published top ten only, and a third treasury company sits at position **15**.
2. **A fifth preferred series exists**, euro-denominated and listed in Luxembourg, so it never appears on the US cover page. Treating **€775,000k** as dollars understates the obligation stack by **$109,120k**.
3. **A percentage whose basis was wrong even though its answer was right.** The put-wall share paired a principal numerator with a carrying-value denominator. Recomputed on one basis it is still **88.1%** — but its companion figure moved from 73.1% to **73.0%**, and that is what we print.

The three numbers

0.865 / 1.088 / 1.276	Three correct valuations of one company at one instant, on three denominators
–8.40%	Bitcoin per basic share, 2026-07-24 to 2026-09-08
88.1% by 2028-09-15	Share of convertible note principal puttable at par, on a date already fixed

What is in the full report

The eight quarterly markers and their readings. The full three-denominator arithmetic, including what happens when the preferred is marked at market rather than at par. The complete capital structure — five preferred series, six note tranches, every put date — and the annual obligation rebuilt line by line. The cross-section of five vehicles measured at one instant, with the one that refuses a leverage story. What **20.32%** of one **$463,132,759** fund is invested in, and what that fund's own page does and does not disclose. A page on each company. Every source that was gated and not circumvented. **448 verification checks, none failing; 165 defects planted across three mutation rounds, and 73 of 73 caught in the final one.**